“There are … at least three good reasons why the declaratory theory should have persisted for some time after the modern English doctrine [of precedent] had begun to take shape. In the first place, it appealed to believers in the separation of powers, to whom anything in the nature of judicial legislation would have been anathema. Secondly, it concealed a fact which Bentham was anxious to expose, namely, that judge-made law is retrospective in its effect. If in December a court adjudges that someone is liable, in consequence of his conduct during the previous January, it would certainly appear to be legislating retrospectively, unless the liability is based on an earlier Act of Parliament, or unless the court is simply following a previous decision. A way of disguising the retrospective character of such a judgment would be to maintain the doctrine that the court really was doing no more than state a rule which anyone could have deduced from well-known principles or common usage, for the conduct in question would then have been prohibited by the law as it stood in January. The third reason for the persistence of the declaratory theory may be thought to justify its retention in a revised form today. When confronted with a novel point, judges always tend to speak as though the answer is provided by the common law.” Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law 30 (4th ed. 1991).
declaratory theory
declaratory theory. The belief that judges’ decisions never make law but instead merely constitute evidence of what the law is. • This antiquated view — held by such figures as Coke and Blackstone — is no longer accepted.
