— Also termed clear-and-present-danger doctrine. [Cases: Constitutional Law 90(3). C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 502, 542, 546–550.]
“The ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine is concerned with distinguishing protected advocacy from unprotected incitement of violent or illegal conduct…. The conventional wisdom of the day was that speech was punishable as an attempt if the natural and reasonable tendency of what was said would be to bring about a forbidden effect. In addition, the criminal defendant must have used the words with an intent to bring about that effect, although such specific intent could be inferred from the tendency of the words on the presumption that one intends the conse-quences of one’s speech. The formula announced by Justice Holmes easily fits within this framework. ‘The question in every case is whether the words used are used in circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.’ ” Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 608 (1978) (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249 (1919)).
