— Also termed Wharton rule; concert-of-action rule. [Cases: Conspiracy 28(1). C.J.S. Conspiracy §§ 209, 213–214.]
“Wharton’s Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted criminal activity, a plurality of criminal agents. In such cases, a closer relationship exists between the conspiracy and the substantive offense because both require collective criminal activity. The substantive offense therefore presents some of the same threats that the law of conspiracy normally is thought to guard against, and it cannot automatically be assumed that the Legislature intended the conspiracy and the substantive offense to remain as discrete crimes upon consummation of the latter. Thus, absent legislative intent to the contrary, the Rule supports a presumption that the two merge when the substantive offense is proved…. More important, as the Rule is essentially an aid to the determination of legislative intent, it must defer to a discernible legislative judgment.” Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785–86, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1293–94 (1975).
